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Abstract 
Some recent developments associated with corporate governance and shareholder activism have shown that 
shareholder empowerment is vital nowadays. Hence, there is a dire need for minority shareholders to be more active 
and responsive in their dealings with corporations. Active shareholder engagement safeguards the interests and the 
rights of the minority shareholders from the effect of agency relationships and from the consequences of the unique 
atmosphere of shareholder activism in Malaysia. A conceptual discussion on shareholder activism has led to a 
conclusion that shareholder activism in developed countries cannot explain the state of activism in emerging 
economies, like Malaysia.  
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1. Introduction 
Active participation and responsible actions by shareholders are critical to effective market discipline and upholding 
a corporate governance culture. Academically, various scholars have agreed that one of the ways to promote healthy 
corporate governance is by protecting the shareholders (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2008; Gantchev, 2013; Huei, 
Ken, Kwong, & Shrives, 2012). Therefore, stemming from good corporate governance, the concept of shareholder 
activism has become a top issue discussed in the corporate world, and debate continues to exist with regard to this 
matter. In the corporate world, the minority shareholders are the least protected corporate participants, due to their 
limited voice in corporate decision-making. Today, however, many platforms have been provided to protect 
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shareholders in exercising their rights and playing their roles in promoting good governance practices in their 
corporations. One such great platform is the shareholder activism agenda.  
In corresponding to agency theory in a corporation setting, the owner-manager relationship forms the principal-
agent relationship; that explicates how shareholder activism works as a relational process. Such a relationship, 
however, has an agency problem. In examining agency theory, Jensen & Meckling (1976), a finance perspective of 
this theory recognized that the agency costs incurred can be reduced by imposing internal controls to keep the agent's 
self-serving behaviour in check. For the same purpose, one possible way to move around the “chairs of the table” is 
through shareholder activism. Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle (2010) studied the antecedents of shareholder activism in 
a few targeted firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Japan and South Korea. It was 
identified that there are two main motives for shareholder activism, i.e., (1) to improve financial performance, and (2) 
to improve the social performance of the firm. Likewise, a few scholars also anticipate shareholder activism to act as 
external control mechanisms in cases of poor internal governance (Gillan & Starks, 2007; Musa, 2012). These facts 
strengthen the idea that shareholder activism should continue to be acknowledged as one effective way to reduce an 
agency problem. In fact, various scholarly works and debates across countries, mostly in developed countries but also 
in some developing countries, including Malaysia, confirm the importance of shareholder activism in the corporate 
sector. Moreover, shareholders at all levels, from institutional investors to individual minority shareholders and hedge 
funds, are now noticed on their strategic efforts to control over the corporations through shareholder activism (e.g., 
Fahmi & Omar, 2005; Gantchev, 2013; Sikavica & Tuschke, 2012; Yeoh, 2010). Hence, one cannot neglect the role 
played by this group of shareholders (majority or minority) in promoting a healthier corporate governance system, and 
eventually strengthening the protection of their rights.   
 
2. Shareholder Activism 
 
Shareholder activism is considered a buzz word in the world of corporate governance to envision the success of 
shareholder empowerment agenda. Broadly speaking, the term shareholder activism can be defined as the use of 
ownership position to actively influence company policy and practice (Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle, 2010; Sjöström, 
2008). In order to ensure that firm policy practice is translated into corporate performance, shareholders need to make 
this goal a reality, according to Gillan & Starks (1998) and Smith (1996). In doing so, it is high time for these 
shareholders, including the minority shareholders, to be more active and responsive in their dealings and 
communications with corporations. The implicit rationale for becoming active and responsive is to boost protection of 
their rights and interest. As far as the protection of shareholders is concerned, Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance has outlined several specific principles which aim at 
increasing such shareholders protection (OECD, 2004). Moreover, a reputable corporate governance institution, The 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), through its revised Global Corporate Governance Principles, 
has also highlighted the roles of the boards as part of achieving the aspiration of the OECD (ICGN, 2009).  
The emphasis on the protection of shareholders and the roles of the board in achieving such an aspiration would 
then need a reconciliation of effort from both parties. Thus, active shareholders’ engagement in various forms would 
be more effective when communicated to and responded by the board of directors.  Such a process would result in 
more responsive managers and would improve the shareholder-executive relationship (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 
2007). With excellent shareholder-executive relationships and interactions, it will be easier to uphold a good corporate 
governance system that provides a powerful set of checks and balances (Montgomery & Kaufman, 2003).  
In accordance with agency theory, shareholders, the principals, constitute the group of individuals in need of 
protection from those self-interested agents (the managers). From a legal perspective, the shareholder term signifies a 
legal person—either an individual or a corporate entity—who holds, and who may be either a registered member of 
the company or is otherwise beneficially entitled to the shares (Chew, 2000).  In the context of shareholder activism, 
on most issues raised, there is a commonality around engagement of the non-controlling minority shareholders 
compared to the controlling shareholders. Being non-controlling minority shareholders does not mean that their role 
is any less significant. Some extant literature has proven that the roles of minority shareholders is significant [e.g., 
governance role, promote transparency, ethical practices, and good governance (Shkolnikov, 2006); a watchdog role 
(Mustafa, Latif, & Taliyang, 2011); largest group of shareholders and active participants in the stock market (Guan, 
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2005; Barber & Odean, 2007), and influencing board composition (Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 
2007)].  
Given this list, it is fair to regard these minority shareholders, in developed as well as developing economies, are 
playing a crucial oversight role in the corporate governance system. In fact, a few incidents have revealed to the world 
the effect of deserting minority shareholders’ significant roles—such as massive asset-stripping during Russian 
privatization, the 1997 financial crisis in Asia, and the limited ability of family-owned firms in the Middle East and 
Latin America to attract investment (Shkolnikov, 2006).   
Whilst ignoring the role of minority shareholder brings negative impacts, evidence also shows that shareholder 
activism has affected corporations in many ways, involving society, ethics and the environment (Frantz & Instefjord, 
2007; Milevskaya, 2013; Sjöström, 2008), CEO pay (Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2010), corporate reporting quality 
(Fahmi & Omar, 2005), firm performance (e.g., Ameer & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 2011; 
Ting, 2013), and directors’ careers and tenure (Gow, Shin, & Srinivasan, 2014). Additionally, one recent journal article 
on a multidisciplinary review of shareholder activism listed the various outcomes of shareholder activism, including 
market reaction, firm performance, shareholder approval, firm adoption, governance, firm practices, activism and the 
environment (Goranova & Ryan, 2013). This gives an indication of the importance of shareholder activism, and shows 
why this topic deserves further understanding and thorough investigation. 
2.1. Shareholder activism approaches 
Broadly stated, shareholder activism denotes a series of reactions by unsatisfied shareholders (Gillan & Starks, 
2007). These reactions come in different forms and are executed by different types of shareholders. Admati & 
Pfleiderer (2009), for example, claimed that when the companies’ management deviates from their responsibility, i.e.,  
does not act in the best interest of the shareholders, the shareholders then normally may sell shares (the so-called 
“Wall Street Rule” or “Wall Street Walk”). Perhaps selling off their shares would be the last resort after initial activism 
efforts have failed.  However, in the context of larger shareholders, if it is not an act of exit, a simple threat (although 
only an intention to act) would suffice (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009).  
 Additionally, negotiation with senior managers or with the boards about their concerns over the companies’ affairs, 
with the intention of bringing about corporate change, is also one form of activism (Mallin & Melis, 2010).  Dialogue, 
a behind-the-scene type of activism that requires confidentiality, has gained momentum in the world of shareholder 
activism (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008; Rehbein, Logsdon, & Buren, 2012). Moreover, unlike dialogue, shareholders’ 
proposal have been widely employed by various activist investors, such as social groups, individuals, and institutional 
investors, with the intention of directing attention, raising awareness, and challenging managers to enhance their firms’ 
social or financial performance (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). At the same time, as mentioned by Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson (1997), shareholders’ proposals serve to alert the managers about issues that deserve attention. These 
proposals, however, vary according to the intention of the activists. These include, as examples, shareholder proposals 
regarding social and environmental issues (David et al., 2007; Sjöström, 2008), governance proposals (Gillan & 
Starks, 2000), and say-on-pay proposals (Ertimur et al., 2010).  
Other than the above-mentioned shareholder activism approaches, activism may also be exercised through letter-
writing or by posting questions to corporate management or the board (Sjöström, 2008), although these are not 
regarded as customary means of ensuring that their rights and interests are protected.  
 Minority shareholder activism can come from various types of minority shareholders, including institutional 
shareholders (e.g., Crespi & Renneboog, 2010; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 2011; Opler & Sokobin, 1995; Smith, 
1996), hedge funds (e.g., Becht, Franks, & Grant, 2014; Coffee & Palia, 2014; Gantchev, 2013), and by the 
retail/individual shareholders (e.g., Gillan & Starks, 1998; Noe, 2002; Mohd Fahmi & Omar, 2005; Yeoh, 2010; Guan, 
2005).  However, in terms of engagement density, individual minority shareholders activism, in the U.S for example, 
was great during the rise of shareholder activism after the SEC introduced a rule on shareholders’ proposal 
submissions. Following that, the shareholder activism wave shifted to the significant roles of the institutional 
investors, and hedge fund activism. Activism by the individual/retail shareholders received less attention, not only in 
practice but also in the academic world (Sikavica & Tuschke, 2012), as compared to institutional and hedge fund 
activism of recent years. This is perhaps due to their relatively small shareholding, which is seen as less significant in 
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voting, and is less likely to have a large impact on the performance of the corporations (Gillan & Starks, 2000). 
Although it appears that the voices of institutional shareholders and hedge funds are heard loudly compared to these 
individual minority shareholders, one cannot deny their significant role in shareholder activism and corporate 
governance.  
 
2.2. Shareholder activism worldwide 
 
Literature on comparative shareholder activism shows that the rationale for shareholder activism differs across 
countries (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Amao, 2011). It is notable that prior studies on shareholder activism are dominated 
by works in developed countries, including the United States (e.g., Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Coffee & Palia, 2014; 
Ertimur et al., 2010; Gillan and Starks,1998, 2000 & 2007; Thompson and Davis, 1997), the United Kingdom (e.g., 
Becht et al., 2008; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Hendry et al., 2007), Korea (Choi and Cho 2003), Japan (Seki 2005) 
and Australia (Anderson, Ramsay, Marshall, & Mitchell, 2007). Shareholder activism does evolve over the years 
centred on issues raised by the activists and shifts in the ownership landscapes of corporations in a particular country.   
As governance practices differ across countries, ownership and control of the firms has become one of the most 
evident differences in corporate governance system. It was noted that some systems are characterised by a wide 
dispersed ownership, while others are to be characterised by concentrated ownership or controlled by families or the 
state (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Pettman & Lamjav, 2009). Compared to a developed country, like 
the United States, in which the ownership of capital is dispersed across small shareholder, it was proved that in 
developing countries, however, concentrated ownership in the firms prevails (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998).  
Economically, in general equity markets, emerging and developed countries differ considerably in terms of rates 
of growth, due to economic and demographic differences, different legal systems and regulatory environments, and 
returns to equity investors (Bliss, 2012). These differences seem to influence the policy maker, the regulator, the 
watchdog groups, the society, and the individual to accept the concept of “one size does not fit all”. Each country is 
unique due to its own corporate ownership structure, legal setting, and influences of cultural values in society. 
Shareholder activism in the United States for example, has evolved considerably after Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) introduced a rule that allows the shareholders to submit proposal to be included for corporate 
ballots in year 1942 (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Since then, vigorous activism by individual investors, institutional 
shareholders such as pension funds, labour unions, pension funds, hedge funds and private equity funds, mushroomed 
accordingly, not only in the U.S but also in countries around the globe. However, practices and activities in the 
developed countries cannot explain the activism held in emerging economies, due to their unique characteristics, 
including those of Malaysia.  
 
2.3. Shareholder activism in Malaysia 
 
Shareholder protection in Malaysia has been the goal of the Securities Commission (SC) since its creation in 1993. 
With its regulatory functions, SC’s ultimate goal is to protect investors in the Malaysian marketplace. In conjunction 
with the agenda of shareholder protection, shareholder activism in Malaysia has started to come into the picture. The 
importance of shareholder activism was taken seriously following the 1997 financial crisis, and it has been regarded 
as part of good corporate governance practice since then. The shareholder protection framework stems from the 
Malaysian Capital Market Plan (CMP 1) presented to the government by the Securities Commission 2000. Since then, 
various regulatory bodies and institutions have considered their roles in support of this aspiration. These include the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board, the Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance, Bursa Malaysia, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, the Minority Shareholders Watchdog 
Group (MSWG), the Malaysia Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA) and the Malaysian 
Investor Relations Association (MIRA). This collaborative effort has resulted in several initiatives, including the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2000, 2007 and 2012), the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 
(Blueprint), the Bursa Corporate Governance Guide, the Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLRC), the Securities 
Industry Development Corporation (a training and development arm of SC), the Malaysia Corporate Governance 
431 Sarina Othman and William G. Borges /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  172 ( 2015 )  427 – 434 
(MCG) Index Scorecard and Malaysia-Asean Corporate Governance Report, the Bursa Corporate Governance Guide, 
the Bursa Investor Relations Manual and the most recent Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors (2014).  
In the interest of general shareholder protection and shareholder activism, various recommendations and 
requirements were derived from this corporate governance framework in Malaysia. In fact, shareholder activism has 
been highlighted since 2002, when YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, former Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, in his keynote address at the Securities Commission’s “Shareholder Activism in Malaysia – The Way 
Forward” seminar, stated that shareholders should not sit in silence and watch irresponsible owners or managers drive 
the companies. He further urged these shareholders to express their dissatisfaction and make the feeling known -either 
through forums such as general meetings or via direct communications to management. 
Therefore, it is clear that shareholder activism is not a new idea in Malaysia. However, in practice, there is room 
for improvement and new insights. The fact that shareholder activism is widely and heavily exercised in developed 
markets like United States of America and United Kingdom has prompted a good deal of scholarly work in this area.  
In Malaysia, while there is some noteworthy work (e.g., Ameer & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Azizan & Ameer, 2012; 
Musa, 2012; Mustafa et al., 2011; Rachagan & Mohd Sulaiman, 2013; Rachagan, 2007; Satkunasingam & 
Shanmugam, 2006), the deep gap in literature on corporate governance and shareholder activism is still very apparent.  
In view of academic works in the Malaysian context, researchers recently have started to recognise the importance 
of minority shareholder roles, in activism and corporate governance as a whole (e.g., Abdul Wahab, How, & 
Verhoeven, 2007; Hashim & Devi, 2012; Musa, 2012). Following activism by institutional shareholders in Malaysia, 
a collaborative effort by the Securities Commission Malaysia and the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group launched 
a code (Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors (2014)) with a set of best practices, collectively developed by 
Malaysia’s largest institutional investors. This code was launched in June 2014 and aims to set out broad principles 
of effective stewardship by institutional investors. The code further strengthens the significant role of institutional 
shareholders as the main drivers of good corporate governance.  
Since the Malaysian market involves long-term investing, hedge funds, and other short-term-oriented shareholders 
are not regulated. Without hedge fund activism, Malaysian shareholder activism is still dominated by the institutional 
shareholders and the retail shareholders. Compared with the individual minority shareholders, institutional 
shareholders have a greater voice, armed with well-organized and structured activism strategies. A question to ponder 
now: What about individual shareholder activism? Is it true that owning a small portion of shares ensures that one’s 
voice will go unheard? Perhaps individual minority shareholders, through MSWG—a champion of shareholder 
activism in Malaysia—will alert corporations that these voices need to be heard.  
Jointly with CMP 1, MSWG was established in the year 2000, funded by four founding organizations. As a 
champion shareholder activism institution in Malaysia, MSWG aims at protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders through shareholder activism. Acting as a proxy for the minority shareholders, upon request, MSWG 
will target ﬁrms by writing query letters to seek clarification about any issues raised and urge the companies to provide 
answer to these questions in the general meetings (Ameer & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Azizan & Ameer, 2012). In this 
respect, the existence of MSWG is considered unique in the emerging markets, where a conservative and collectivist 
culture prevails in societies like Malaysia (Rachagan, 2007; Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006). Hence, the 
existence of this watchdog is essential as a platform for shareholders' concerns to be raised, in order to control 
managerial moral hazards and expropriation (Azizan & Ameer, 2012). 
3. Shareholder activism in Malaysia: The challenges 
The effort to create a more conducive protection environment for the minority shareholders in Malaysia involves 
multiple hurdles. First is the ownership structure in Malaysian corporations. Malaysia, like most Asian countries, is 
characterised by concentrated shareholding (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 1999; Singam, 2003; Tam & Tan, 
2007). Ownership concentration is claimed to cause expropriation of minority shareholders' rights (Claessens & Fan, 
2002; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999; Mustafa et al., 2011; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). A study was conducted in 1999 on the effects of controlling shareholders’ in the nine East Asian 
countries, and it was discovered that Malaysia is a country where expropriation of minority shareholders is likely to 
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happen (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 1999). In this regard, the absence of effective external governance, concentrated 
ownership may endanger the corporate governance system (Morck, Wolfrenzon, & Yeung, 2005).  
Besides concentrated ownership, Malaysian companies include many salient shareholders, such as the government 
(government-controlled companies), institutional shareholders, and families—which cause the minority shareholders 
to have little or no influence over managerial decision-making (Ameer & Abdul Rahman, 2009). Empirical studies 
have also demonstrated the presence of salient shareholders has influenced decisions made by corporate governance 
committees, i.e., remuneration committees that eventually initiate expropriation to the minority shareholders (Jaafar, 
James & Abdul Wahab, 2012). This raises some interesting questions: Are the minority shareholders concerned about 
engaging (using any of the shareholder activism approaches) with management? And will the management in the 
presence of these controlling shareholders listen to the voice of minority shareholders?  
From the standpoint of shareholders, they seek an opportunity to actively communicate and become involved in 
decision-making, as they are the owners of the company. Yet it seems that these shareholders, especially the mass of 
individual shareholders (majority or minority), are very passive (Black, 1990; Guan, 2005; Yeoh, 2010). Their 
passivity gives one the impression that they are not actively involved. Moreover, they routinely decline to take action 
in the event of misbehaviour by corporate officers (Langevoort, 2009). Individual minority shareholders do not seem 
to realise that they are capable of influencing and interfering with corporate decision-making. Sadly, they are not 
utilising the advantages at their disposal in terms of their size or rights as the owners of the firms. Guan (2005) stated, 
in fact, that individual minority shareholders form the largest group of shareholders and could therefore be the most 
active participants in corporations.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper was written to signify our effort to understand the extent of shareholder involvement, and activism, 
especially in Malaysia. Extant scholarship on shareholder activism was reviewed and it was noted that shareholder 
activism has long been practiced ambitiously in developed countries such as the U.S. However, studies of shareholder 
activism in Malaysia—which could in fact be the catalyst for greater shareholder activism in the country—are still in 
the infancy stage. So there is a need for more research in this area of studies. Perhaps, future research should also 
focus on a complex relationship between minority shareholders and the companies, and regard shareholder activism 
as an interactive process. Hopefully, this paper deals with some of the fundamental issues central to the fulfillment of 
this aspiration.  
References 
Abdul Wahab, E. A., How, J. C. Y., & Verhoeven, P. (2007). The Impact of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance: Compliance, 
Institutional Investors and Stock Performance. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), 106–129. doi:10.1016/S1815-
5669(10)70025-4 
Adegbite, E., Amaeshi, K., & Amao, O. (2011). The Politics of Shareholder Activism in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 105(3), 389–402. 
doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0974-y 
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2009). The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice. Review of Financial Studies, 
22(7), 2645–2685. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp037 
Ahmad Badawi, A. (2002). Keynote address by YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at the “Shareholder 
Activism in Malaysia – The Way Forward” seminar, Conference Hall, Securities Commission Securities Commission Malaysia | Securities 
Commission M. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from http://www.sc.com.my/post_archive/keynote-address 
Ameer, R., & Abdul Rahman, R. (2009). The Impact Of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group Activism On The Performance Of Targeted Firms 
In Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, 5(1), 67–92. 
Anderson, K., Ramsay, I., Marshall, S., & Mitchell, R. (2007). Union Shareholder Activism in the Context of Declining Labour Law Protection: 
four Australian case studies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(1), 45–56. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00541.x 
Azizan, S. S., & Ameer, R. (2012). Shareholder activism in family-controlled firms in Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(8), 774–794. 
doi:10.1108/02686901211257046 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2007). All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional 
Investors. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 785–818. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm079 
Becht, M., Franks, J., & Grant, J. (2014). The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism : An International Study (No. Working Paper No 402/2014). 
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 
433 Sarina Othman and William G. Borges /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  172 ( 2015 )  427 – 434 
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2008). Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus 
Fund. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3093–3129. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn054 
Black, B. (1990). Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review, 89(3), 520–608. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1289384 
Bliss, R. T. (2012). Private Equity: The Differences between Developed and Emerging Markets. In D. Klonowski (Ed.), Private Equity in Emerging 
Markets: The New Frontiers of International Finance (pp. 3–16). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chew, M. (2000). Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (p. 282). Butterworths Asia. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.com.my/books/about/Minority_Shareholders_Rights_and_Remedie.html?id=-NGFAAAACAAJ&pgis=1 
Choi, W.-Y., & Cho, S. H. (2003). Shareholder activism in Korea: An analysis of PSPD’s activities. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 11(3), 349–
363. doi:10.1016/S0927-538X(03)00028-3 
Chung, H., & Talaulicar, T. (2010). Forms and Effects of Shareholder Activism. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 253–257. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00806.x 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (1999). Expropriation of Minority Shareholders : Evidence from East Asia. World Bank 
(pp. 1–33) 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (1999). The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. World Bank (pp.1-53) 
Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. (2002). Corporate governance in Asia: A survey. International Review of Finance, 3(2), 71–104. doi:10.1111/1468-
2443.00034 
Coffee, J. C., & Palia, D. (2014). The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications (No. Law Working Paper No. 266/2014). 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496518 
Crespi, R., & Renneboog, L. (2010). Is (Institutional) Shareholder Activism New? Evidence from UK Shareholder Coalitions in the Pre-Cadbury 
Era. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 274–295. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00795.x 
David, P., Bloom, M., & J.Hillman, A. (2007). Investor Activism , Managerial Responsiveness , And Corporate Social Performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(1), 91–100. doi:10.1002/smj 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management. The Academy of Management Review, 
22(1), 20. doi:10.2307/259223 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics, 
88(3), 430–465. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.007 
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Muslu, V. (2010). Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. Review of Financial Studies, 24(2), 535–592. 
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq113 
Fahmi, F. M., & Omar, N. (2005). Corporate Reporting on Minority Shareholders Information and Its Implication on Shareholders Activism in 
Malaysia. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 3(1), 17–39 
Frantz, P., & Instefjord, N. (2007). Socially and privately optimal shareholder activism. Journal of Management & Governance, 11(1), 23–43. 
doi:10.1007/s10997-007-9013-x 
Gantchev, N. (2013). The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 610–
631. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.007 
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (1998). A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence. Contemporary Finance Digest, 2(3), 
10–34 
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism : the role of institutional investors. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 57, 275–305 
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2007). The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(1), 
55–73. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x 
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2013). Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review. Journal of Management, 40(5), 1230–1268. 
doi:10.1177/0149206313515519 
Gow, I., Shin, S., & Srinivasan, S. (2014). Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism (No. Working Paper 14-071). Retrieved from 
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/areas/accounting/events/documents/gowshinsrinivasan2014.pdf 
Guan, C. . (2005). Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia issues and challenges. In K. L. Ho (Ed.), Reforming Corporate Governance in 
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Hadani, M., Goranova, M., & Khan, R. (2011). Institutional investors , shareholder activism , and earnings management. Journal of Business 
Research, 64(12), 1352–1360. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.004 
Hashim, H. A., & Devi, S. S. (2012). Institutional Monitoring and Earnings Quality in Malaysia. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 
419–426. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.11.143 
Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., Roberts, J., Street, T., & Cb, C. (2007). Responsible Ownership , Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder 
Activism. Competition & Change, 11(3), 223–240. doi:10.1179/102452907X212401 
Huei, N. S., Ken, Y., Kwong, L. C., & Shrives, P. (2012). Factors Influencing the Performance of Family-Controlled Publicly-Listed Firms in 
Malaysia. Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, 1(1), 179–206 
ICGN Global Corporate Governance Principles : Revised ( 2009 ). International Corporate Governance Network. . London, UK. 
Jaafar, S. B., James, K., & Abdul Wahab, E. A. (2012). Remuneration Committee and Director Remuneration in Family-Owned Companies: 
Evidence from Malaysia. International Review of Business Research Papers, 8(7), 17–38. Retrieved from 
http://www.bizresearchpapers.com/2. Syaiful.pdf 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3(4), 305–360. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
434   Sarina Othman and William G. Borges /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  172 ( 2015 )  427 – 434 
Judge, W. Q., Gaur, A., & Muller-Kahle, M. I. (2010). Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi-Country 
Study. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 258–273. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00797.x 
Karpoff, J. (2001). The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A survey of empirical findings. Unpublished working paper. Retrieved 
from http://faculty.washington.edu/~karpoff/Research/SApaper.doc 
Kim, K. a., Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P., & Nofsinger, J. R. (2007). Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: 
Evidence from Europe. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 859–880. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.09.001 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-SIlanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 11131–55. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal Of Finance, LIV(2), 471–517 
Langevoort, D. (2009). The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets. Virginia Law Review, 95(4), 1025–1083. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27698032 
Logsdon, J. M., & Van Buren, H. J. (2008). Beyond the Proxy Vote: Dialogues Between Shareholder Activists and Corporations. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 87(S1), 353–365. doi:10.1007/s10551-008-9807-z 
Mallin, C., & Melis, A. (2010). Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 16(2), 
171–176. doi:10.1007/s10997-010-9138-1 
Milevskaya, M. (2013). Shareholder Activism of Responsible Investors. The Macrotheme Review, 2(3), 30–33. Retrieved from 
http://macrotheme.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/4MilMR23.40131206.pdf 
Montgomery, C. A., & Kaufman, R. (2003). The Board ’s Missing Link. Harvard Business Review, 81(3), 26–33. 
Morck, R., Wolfrenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 
XLIII(September), 655–720. 
Musa, M. (2012). The Influence of Institutional Shareholder Activism as a Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanism in Malaysia. Waset.org, 
71, 1328–1332. Retrieved from http://www.waset.org/publications/10487 
Mustafa, N., Latif, R., & Taliyang, S. (2011). Expropriation Of Minority Shareholders’rights: Evidence From Malaysia. International Journal of 
Business an Social Science, 2(13), 215–220. Retrieved from 
http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._13_Special_Issue_July_2011/24.pdf 
Noe, T. H. (2002). Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure. Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 289–318. doi:10.1093/rfs/15.1.289 
OECD (2004), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing. 
Opler, T. C., & Sokobin, J. (1995). Does Coordinated Institutional Activism Work ? An Analysis of the Activities of the Council of Institutional 
Investors, Dice Center For Research In Financial Economics. (pp. 1–29). doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.46880 
Pettman, J., & Lamjav, N. (2009). The Evolution of Corporate Governance in China. Copenhagen Business School. Retrieved from 
http://studenttheses.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10417/797/jason_pettman_og_navchaa_lamjav.pdf?sequence 
Rachagan, S. (2007). Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Malaysia : Would the Self-Enforcing Model Protect Minority 
Shareholders? The Corporate Governance Law Review, 3(1), 1–55 
Rachagan, S., & Mohd Sulaiman, A. N. (2013). Controlling Shareholders: Issues and Challenges for Shareholders’ Empowerment in Directors' 
Remuneration in Corporate Malaysia. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 1–28. doi:10.1515/asjcl-2013-0020 
Rehbein, K., Logsdon, J. M., & Buren, H. J. (2012). Corporate Responses to Shareholder Activists: Considering the Dialogue Alternative. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 112(1), 137–154. doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1237-2 
Satkunasingam, E., & Shanmugam, B. (2006). The Consequences of Culture on Shareholder Activism in Malaysia. JAMAR, 4(1), 45–56 
Seki, T. (2005). Legal Reform and Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors in Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
13(3), 377–385. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00432.x 
Shkolnikov, A. (2006). Protecting Minority Shareholders in Emerging Markets. Center for International Private Enterprise. Retrieved from 
www.cipe.org 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of Finance. LII(2), 737–783. 
Sikavica, K., & Tuschke, A. (2012). When Do Small Shareholders Take Action Against’ Their 'Firm?: A Social Identity Approach to Small 
Shareholder Activism, 1–37. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180039 
Singam, K. (2003). Corporate governance in Malaysia. Bond Law Review, 15(1). Retrieved from 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol15/iss1/13/?utm_source=epublications.bond.edu.au%2Fblr%2Fvol15%2Fiss1%2F13&utm_medium=
PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages 
Sjöström, E. (2008). Shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility: what do we know? Sustainable Development, 16(3), 141–154. 
doi:10.1002/sd.361 
Smith, M. P. (1996). Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors; Evidence from CalPERS. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 227–253. 
Tam, O. K., & Tan, M. G.-S. (2007). Ownership, Governance and Firm Performance in Malaysia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
15(2), 208–222. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00555.x 
Thompson, T. A., & Davis, G. F. (1997). The Politics of Corporate Control and the Future of Shareholder Activism in the United States. Corporate 
Governance, 5(3), 152–159. doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00055 
Ting, H.-I. (2013). The Influence of Insiders and Institutional Investors on Firm Performance. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and 
Policies, 16(04), 1350027. doi:10.1142/S0219091513500276 
Yeoh, K. (2010). The behaviour of individual investors in Malaysia: a governance perspective. Northumbria University. Retrieved from 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/3246 
 
